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COMMENTS
USE OF THE COURT ORDER OF RELINQUISHMENT IN

ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS IN WASHINGTON
JOHN W SWEET*

The necessity for the court order of relinquishment in adoption
proceedings in Washington has until recently presented a confusing
problem. In 1939 the legislature enacted a statute entitled "Persons

Authorized to Adopt Children,"' which provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, society, association or corporation, except the parents, to assume the permanent care, custody or control
of any child under the age of majority, unless authorized so to do by a
written order of a superior court of the state.
The statute also makes it unlawful for a parent to relinquish custody
of a minor child without such an order.
Those who initiated the statute and backed its passage felt that it
* LL.B., University of Washington, 1948.

'Wash. Laws 1939, c. 162, § 1, appearing as REM. Rzv. STAT.

§ 358-1].

§

1700-1, [P P C.
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would provide close judicial supervision of the transfer of custody in
order that the bartermg of' mnnor children might be effectively prevented. It was intended in addition to protect the rights of natural
parents by making it more difficult to perpetrate a fraud upon them
in procuring the relinqushment of a child. The 1939 statute is quite
similar to the 1933 statute, which reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, society, association or corporation, except the parents, or relatives within the second degree, or a benevolent or charitable society incorporated under the laws of this state for the
purpose of, and engaged in the business of, receiving, caring for, and placing
out for adoption, orphan, homeless, neglected, abandoned or, abused minor
children, to assume the permanent care, custody, or control of any child
under fourteen
(14) years of age, unless authorized to do so by an order
2
of the court.
This prior statute clearly seems to have been designed to eliminate
trafficking in children and the z939 statute appears to have been
intended to expand the coverage of the earlier law by omitting the
exceptions as to charitable institutions that were contained in the 1933
statute.
In 1943 there was enacted legislation which purported to be a complete act covering the matter of adoption.$ This statute fully prescribes the procedure necessary for obtaining an order of adoption,
and at no point in the statute is the order of relinquishment mentioned
or its use specifically required. The 1945 amendments " and the 1947
amendments' pertaining to adoption do not add anything with regard
to the use of the relinquishment order.
Prior to the decision in the case of In the Matter of the Adoption of
Donna Mae Sipes6 it was not settled whether it was necessary to obtain a court order of relinquishment as a condition to jurisdiction to
hear and determine whether or not the adoption would be permitted.
An informal poll of eleven of the superior courts of this state was
taken recently Five of the courts required such an order. One court
replied that four of the judges who alternated in that court in the
hearing of adoption cases required the order while the fifth judge did
2 Wash.

Laws 1933, c. 62, § 1. Repealed, Wash. Laws 1935, c. 151 § 7
Wash. Laws 1943, c. 268, appearing as REr. REv. STAT. Supp. 1943, §§ 1699-1 to
1699-17, [P. P C. §§ 354f-1 to 354-33].
4Wash. Laws, 1945, c. 191, appearing as REm. REv. STAT. Supp. 1945, § 1699-12,
[P.5P C. § 354f-23].
Wash. Laws 1947, c. 251, appearing as REm. REv. STAT. Sup'. 1947, §§ 1699-4,.9,
10, 12, and 15.
624 Wn. (2d) 603, 167 P. (2d) 139, (1946).
8
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not. The other five courts did not require the order. " As to whether
the court would consider the existence or nonexistence of an order of
relinquishment relevant in the event that a natural parent whose consent was requisite to adoption desired to withdraw consent, one court
thought that it was relevant; five courts thought it not relevant; in
one court the judges were not in agreement; while the question had
not risen before four of the courts.' All eleven courts agreed that an
order of relinquishment would not be required in a guardianship proceeding even though it nught involve the assuming of permanent care,
custody or control of a child under the age of majority
The confusion in this matter has been substantially rectified by the
decision in the case of In the Matter of the Adoption of Donna Mae
Sipes.' In this case the natural mother of an illegitimate child, shortly
after the birth of the child, executed and delivered to A a written
document of consent for the adoption of this child by A, leaving the
child in the custody of A. No court order of relinquishment was obtained. Subsequently an adoption proceeding was conducted in the
regular manner in accordance with Rmxi. REv STAT. Supp 1943,
§§1699-1 to 1699-17 [P.P.C. §§354f-I to 354f-33 ], whereby A was
given an interlocutory order of adoption. Within the six months interlocutory period prescribed by REm. REv STAT. SuPP 1943, §1699-12
[P.P.C. §354f-23], the mother petitioned to have the interlocutory
order vacated, setting up the failure of A to get an order of relinquishment as prescribed by RE . REv STAT. §1700-I [P.P.C. §358-I]
Here was presented a question of first impression in this state: Can
the mother of an illegitimate child execute a valid consent sufficient
to give the court jurisdiction of an adoption proceeding, without first
securing the order of relinquishment? The trial court denied the
mother's petition to vacate the interlocutory order of adoption of her
7 The question used in the poll was worded. "In a regularly conducted adoption
proceeding [before In the Matter of the Adoption of Donna Mae Sipes, 24 Wn.(2d)
603, 167 P. (2d) 139 (1946) ]was an order of relinquishment required before the adop-

tion petition was approved?" The Superior Courts of the Counties of Whatcom, Ferry
and Okanogan, Stevens, Garfield and Columbia, and Kittitas answered this "Yes",
while the Superior Courts of the Counties of Lewis, Clark, Douglas and Grant, Adams
and Benton, and King replied. "No." In Spokane County the judges' opinions were not

in agreement as to the answer to this question.
s The question was worded. "In the event that a natural parent whose consent was

requisite to adoption desired to withdraw consent during the six months interlocutory
period, was the existence or nonexistence of an order of relinquishment considered relevant?" The Superior Court of Stevens County answered this in the affirmative; the
courts of Lewis, Clark, Douglas and Grant, Adams and Benton, and King counties
answered in the negative, while the judges of the Spokane County Superior Court disagreed as to the relevancy of the order.
9 Supra, note 6.
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child and entered a final order of adoption. This judgment was affirmed
on appeal.
The Supreme Court of Washington reasoned that the relinquishment statute was designed to prevent the release of children to persons, associations, and corporations who did not desire to adopt such
children, but who procured their permanent care, custody, and control and thereafter placed them out for adoption. The statute, it said,
was never intended to apply to a situation where the parent, who was
legally entitled to consent to the adoption of her child, had given that
consent in writing, and the adopters had proceeded to obtain an order
of adoption.
The decision appears to have the effect of removing from the adoption proceeding the court order of relinquishment in all cases where
the persons whose consent is necessary for adoption have given written consent. The child care and protective organizations do not use
the order, for, before taking a child into custody, such groups (which
have as their objects the purpose of caring for or obtaining homes for
dependent, neglected, or delinquent children) procure a commitment
of such children from the Juvenile Court pursuant to statutes designed
to handle cases of delinquent or dependent children." And such institutions do not relinquish custody of a child until the interlocutory
order of adoption" has been granted. Certain hospitals have followed
the practice of requiring a court order of relinquishment before permitting a person other than the natural parent to take the child from
the hospital in order to fully protect themselves; however, even this
precautionary step would not seem necessary if the hospital has
written consent of the natural parent to the release of the child.
Most assuredly, the natural parents who are relinquishing their
child to another should be given adequate protection from those persons and associations who would wrongfully take the child from its
parents. But to require a court order of relinquishment as a condition
to the entertaining of an adoption petition is to put the cart before
the horse. Our adoption statutes provide for a thorough investigation
to be made before even the interlocutory order is granted.1 Notice to
a nonconsenting parent or guardian is required by statute, 2 and the
courts have in the case of In the Matter of the Adoption of a Minor"3
made it clear that the notice provisions will be given broad interpre10

E

REV. STAT.

§1987-9; [P.P.C. §359-15].

11 RE. REv. STAT. SuPP. 1947, §1699-10.
12 REm. REv. STAT. Supp. 1947, §1699-9.
18 129 Wash. Dec. 700, 189 P.(2d) 458, (1948).
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tation and that the spirit of the statute will not be circumvented by
the use of technicalities. In the latter case the court held that it was
necessary that the husband of the mother of an illegitimate child be
given notice of the adoption proceedings, the child being presumptively
his. This was held in spite of the language of the statute which reads:
"If the court is satisfied of the illegitimacy of the child to be adopted,
and so finds, no notice to the father of such child shall be required.""
The courts similarly require strict adherence to the written consent
provisions of the statute,"' the court deciding in In The Matter of the
Adoption of Lots Ann Hope"6 that consent of both parents is necessary before the court will permit the adoption of children born of an
illegal marriage contracted in good faith and later annulled.
It is clear that the natural parents are given adequate protection
under our present adoption procedures. If a parent whose consent is
necessary for adoption has given written consent for a particular
person to adopt the child there should be a showing of fraud or of very
strong and compelling circumstances why that parent should be
allowed to revoke the consent after the interlocutory order of adoption has been granted. To permit otherwise would be to subject the
proceedings to a degree of uncertainty and unfairness which the adoption statute was designed to avoid.
It appears that for all intents and purposes the court order of relinquishment is no longer a necessary step in the state of Washington's
procedure for the supervision of the welfare of children. In the Matter
of the Adoption of Donna Mae Sipes" removes this order from the
adoption procedure whenever written consent has been given, and the
Delinquent Children and Juvenile Court laws1 8 prescribe adequate
procedures and are customarily used for the relinquishment of children
to those who do not themselves desire to adopt. This result seems
desirable, for it eliminates from the adoption system a step winch
seemed superfluous. The statutory plan for adoption has in many
courts functioned smoothly without requiring the order of relinquishment.19 The holding should assist in making the Washington adoption
system operate in a uniform and sure manner, giving ample protection
to all parties concerned.
"4The last sentence of REm. REv. STAT. Supp. 1947, §1699-9.
25 REm. REV. STAT. Supp. 1947, §1699-4.
6 130 Wash. Dec. 170, 191 P.(2d) 289, (1948).
17 Supra,note 6.
i8 Rzm.REv. STAT. §§1987-1 to 1987-18, [P.P.C. §§359-1 to 359-35].
19

Supra, note 7

